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THE FRAMING OF CHARLES W. CHESNUTT:
 
PRACTICAL DECONSTRUCTION
IN THE AFRO-AMERICAN TRADITION
Craig Werner
University of Wisconsin
First, three quotations.
“Under exegetical pressure, self-reference demonstrates the
 
impossibility of self-possession. When poems denounce poetry as
 lies, self-referentiality is the source of undecidability, which is not
 ambiguity but a structure of logical irresolvability: if a poem speaks
 true in describing poetry 
as
 lies, then it lies; but if its claim that  
poems lie is a lie, then it must speak true.”—Jonathan Culler, On
 Deconstruction: Theory and Criticism after Structuralism (202).
“They ain’t no different from nobody else....They mouth cut cross
 
ways, ain’t it? Well, long as you don’t see no man wid they mouth
 cut up and down, you know they’ll all lie jus’ like de rest of us.”—Zora
 Neale Hurston, Mules and Men (22).
“The text is a beautiful, slender stream, meandering gracefully
 
through a wide meadow of margin.”—Charles Waddell Chesnutt,
 “Baxter’s Procrustes”
 
(419).
As the Signifying Monkey and Brer Rabbit have always known, as
 Charles Chesnutt knew in 1890, 
as
 Euro-American literary theorists  
working in the wake of Jacques Derrida
 
have discovered, truth lies in a  
lie. By focusing on the writing of Chesnutt, one of the most
 enigmatic figures of the post-reconstruction era, I hope to prefigure a
 politically significant
 
discourse  between Euro-American literary theory  
and the Afro-American expressive tradition it has excluded from its
 premises.
But before I begin, two remarks on the premises. First, an
 
anecdote explaining the hostility toward
 
the theoretical enterprise, until  
recently my central position, which may emerge throughout this
 essay. 
As
 a graduate student, I participated briefly in a critical theory  
reading group. At one meeting, a prominent theoretician responded to
 Missy Dehn Kubitschek’s question concerning the relevance of 
theory to a non-specialist audience with the contemptuous statement, “I don’
t much care what the guys at the comer garage think about my work.”
 Juxtaposed with the frequently recondite and exclusive vocabulary of
 theoretical writing, this highlighted what I perceived, and to some
 extent continue to perceive, as an elitist stance which contributes to the
 effective power of
 
the institutions deconstruction ostensibly calls into  
question. As an aesthetic populist who takes James Joyce, James
1
Werner: The Framing of Charles W. Chesnutt
Published by eGrove, 1991
2 THE FRAMING OF CHARLES W. CHESNUTT
Brown and George Clinton with equal comico-seriousness,
 
I consigned  
the whole enterprise to the nether regions and went about my
 business. Only recently, inspired
 
by the gentle chiding of autodidacts  
Geoff King and Charles Weir and academics Kathy Cummings of the
 University of Washington and Robert Stepto of the Afro-American
 Studies Department of Yale—a ritual ground given
 
over to unspeakable  
forces in my neo-populist demonology—have I begun to realize that,
 professional argot and elitist individuals aside, the guys at the comer
 garage may
 
have been telling lies about their true knowledge  of decon ­
struction all along.
Second, and perhaps the
 
paranoia inheres in the populism, I’ve felt  
for some time that
 
I was standing alone in my reading of  Chesnutt as  
an exceptionally complex modernist/post-modemist ironist situated on
 the
 
margins of a literary marketplace conditioned first by  the plantation  
tradition stereotypes of
 
Thomas Nelson Page and later by the virulent  
racist diatribes of Thomas Dixon. Standard literary histories evince
 almost no awareness of Chesnutt’s complexity; The Cambridge
 History of American Literature (edited by Carl Van Doren, et. al.,
 1917) omits all mention of Chesnutt while the fourth edition of The
 Literary History of 
the
 United States (edited by Robert Spiller, et. al.,  
1974) dismisses him as a minor Plantation Tradition figure
 overshadowed by Joel Chandler Harris. Even William Andrews’
 sensitive study The Literary Career of Charles W. Chesnutt credits
 Chesnutt with relatively little awareness of structural irony or meta-
 fictional subtlety. Aesthetic isolation mocks my populist soul; on the
 other hand, originality intrigues my academic mind. Whatever the
 case,
 
Afro-American novelist John Wideman’s piece “Surfiction”  in the  
Summer 1985 issue of The Southern Review—my copy of which was
 lost in the mail and arrived only this week, on All Souls Day—seems
 to be a response to my unsounded call or a call for my unsounded
 response. I say “seems” because, 
upon
 recognizing the Chesnutt figure  
created by Wideman, who recently
 
identified Brer Rabbit as his  favorite  
literary character when questioned by the New York Times Book
 Review, I decided not to read 
the
 rest of his piece until I  had figured out  
my own position. Incidentally, were I permitted (to quote one of
 Chesnutt’s more famous black contemporaries), I might suggest some
 duplicity in the identification of Wideman’s words as “fiction” in the
 table of contents of The Southern Review. (Space for future
 retrospective commentary: after reading both Wideman’s essay and
 version of this paper at a conference, I’m surer than ever that it’s
 nothing but
 
a lie.) With these positions in mind, we can begin.
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Henry-Louis Gates suggests the implicit connection between the
 
Afro-American folk tradition from which Chesnutt drew many of his
 figures and the deconstructionist sensibility when he presents “the
 Signifying Monkey, he who dwells at the margins of discourse” as a
 figure embodying the “Afro-American rhetorical strategy of signifying
 [as] a rhetorical act which is not engaged in the game of information
­giving. Signifying turns on the play and chain of signifiers, and not
 on some supposedly transcendent signified” (129-31). Locating his
 own position in the space between Euro-American theory and Afro-
 American signifying, Gates applies his insights concerning “folk
 deconstruction” to Afro-American literary history in
 
a diagram centering  
on Hurston and including Jean Toomer, Sterling Brown, Ralph Ellison,
 Richard Wright, and Ishmael Reed. In response to this diagram—
 clearly
 
intended by Gates as provisional rather  than definitive—I would  
suggest that, especially in The Conjure Woman (1899) and the self-
 referential story “Baxter’s Procrustes” (1905), Chesnutt prefigures both
 the Afro- and Euro-American understandings of literary signification in
 a way that we have only recently begun to comprehend. In advancing
 this argument, I am suggesting not simply that deconstructionist
 methodologies can be profitably applied to Chesnutt’s work or that a
 general parallel exists between the Afro-American tradition and Euro
­American theory. Rather, I am suggesting that Chesnutt consciously
 orients his discourse toward crucial elements of the deconstructionist
 project and that he anticipates constructive approaches to several issues
 which remain extremely problematic in contemporary theoretical
 discourse. From a deconstructionist perspective, it should come as no
 surprise that focusing on the excluded margin, the Afro-American
 literary tradition which has never enjoyed the social privilege allowing
 it to dismiss the masters from its awareness, should help cast light 
on the blind spots of Euro-American theory.
By focusing on the general (and to the extent possible, shared)
 
understanding of deconstruction in contemporary academic discourse, I
 hope to lay some groundwork for future cross-cultural discussions
 oriented toward the articulation and
 
refinement  of specific implications  
of Derrida’s positions. Terry Eagleton’s chapter on “Post
­Structuralism” in Literary Theory: An Introduction and Culler’s
 chapter on “Critical Consequences” in On Deconstruction, two works
 which diverge sharply in their views of the larger significance of the
 movement, share a number of premises I shall treat as consensual
 positions. Both understand deconstruction as a philosophically
 grounded approach to thought which: 1) emphasizes the problematic
 relationship between the linguistic signifier and the “transcendent
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signified” (Eagleton, 131; Culler, 188); 2) challenges, and ultimately
 
decenters, hierarchies of thought or expression based on binary
 oppositions which privilege one term over its ostensible opposite
 (Culler, 213; Eagleton, 132); 3) focuses on the “marginal” terms
 excluded
 
from the  discourse in order to  recognize the way in which the  
text subverts its own meaning (Culler, 215; Eagleton, 132-33); 
4) recognizes that all signifiers derive their meaning from “traces” of other
 signifiers and concentrates on the “play of signifiers,” creating a
 theoretically endless chain which frustrates attempts at closure
 (Eagleton, 134; Culler, 188). Eagleton summarizes the deconstructive
 project as follows: “Deconstruction tries to show how such
 oppositions, in order to hold themselves in place, are sometimes
 betrayed into inverting or collapsing themselves, or need to banish to
 the text’s margins certain niggling details which can be made to return
 and plague them...The tactic of deconstructive criticism, that is to say,
 is to show how texts come to embarrass their own ruling systems of
 logic” (133). Culler echoes and extends this understanding when he
 writes of the deconstructionist interest in “previous readings which, in
 separating a text 
into
 the essential and marginal elements, have created  
for the text an identity that the text itself, through the power of its
 marginal elements, can subvert.” Generalizing this approach in a
 manner consistent with Eagleton’s insistence on the contextual
 determinants of textual meaning, Culler asserts “One could, therefore,
 identify deconstruction with the twin principles of the contextual
 determination of meaning and the infinite
 
extendability of context.”
Chesnutt, whose active publishing career had ended by the time
 Ferdinand de Saussure delivered the lectures which would become the
 Course in General Linguistics between 1907 and 1911, derived his
 awareness of the problematical nature of binary oppositions,
 
hierarchies  
in discourse, and the signifier-signified relationship from two basic
 sources: the folk tradition on which
 
he drew, and  the  literary context in  
which he wrote. As Hurston, Ellison and Gates have noted in quite
 different contexts, the
 
Afro-American folk tradition encodes a profound  
suspicion of and resistance to Euro-American expression. Placed in a
 marginal position enforced by institutional structures and physical
 violence, Afro-Americans, especially those without access to the
 mainstream educational system, have always been acutely aware of the
 radical inadequacy of white figures of black experience. Experiencing
 what W.E.B. DuBois called double consciousness—“this sense of
 always looking at one’s self through the eyes of
 
others, of measuring  
one’s 
soul
 by the tape of a world that looks on in  amused contempt and  
pity” (17)— Afro-Americans, individually and communally, learned
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quickly to manipulate the gap between signifier and signified.
 
Constructing
 
elaborate verbal “masks” in everyday  discourse as well as 
in the spirituals and animal tales, “slaves” 
(to
 use the Euro-American  
signifier) continually (and because of their political oppression,
 implicitly) subverted the oppositional racist association of white with
 such privileged terms as “good,” “God,” “mature,” and “civilized,” and
 black with such excluded terms as “evil,” “devil,” “child-like” and
 “savage.” Focusing on the “marginal” elements of the dominant
 discourse (i.e. themselves), they learned to effectively decenter social
 and political hierarchies in order to survive, psychologically and
 physically. Ultimately, as Ellison notes in his wonderfully titled essay
 “Change the Joke and Slip the Yoke” in his proto-deconstructionist
 book Shadow and Act, this shaped an expressive tradition based
 precisely on the closure-resisting play of signifiers articulating “a land
 of masking jokers” in which “the motives hidden behind the mask are
 as numerous as the ambiguities the mask conceals” (70). Chesnutt,
 probably the first Afro-American writer to assume the truth lying
 behind Ellison’s signifying, incorporates this deconstructive folk
 sensibility into his literary productions in a highly self-conscious
 manner.
The specific manifestations of this self-consciousness, however,
 
derive directly from the tradition of racial signification in the Euro
­American writing of the 1880s and 1890s. When Chesnutt began to
 publish in mainstream magazines such as Family Fiction and the
 Atlantic Monthly in 1886 and 1887, he encountered editors and readers
 deeply influenced by Joel Chandler Harris’s tales of Uncle Remus and
 Brer Rabbit. Harris remains one of the least understood, and perhaps
 least understandable, figures in one of the least understood/standable
 currents of the Southern literary tradition: that of minstrelsy. On the
 surface, Harris appears to articulate a straightforward version of the
 Plantation Tradition in his tales of
 
an essentially child-like black man 
gently harassed into telling charming animal stories by a young white
 boy who brings him sweets and affection from the big house.
 Occupying the center of the American consciousness of Harris—the
 Disney minstrel show Song of the South is only the most obvious of
 many examples—,this image would seem to dictate dismissal of the
 Uncle Remus tales as the type of “blackface minstrelsy” Berndt
 Ostendorf describes 
as
 “a symbolic slave code,  s t of self-humiliating  
rules designed by white racists for the disenfranchisement of the black
 self’ (66).
Beneath both the benevolent and maleficent surface(s) of the
 
minstrel tradition, however, lie unsuspected depths where Harris
 
joins  
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William Faulkner and Derrida to comprise a significant genealogy in
 
which Chesnutt is the crucial and crucially unrecognized missing
 relation. The most powerful recent Faulkner criticism, that written by
 John Irwin and Eric Sundquist, recognizes a troubling link between the
 irresolvability of the Faulknerian text—Irwin calls Quentin’s narration
 of Absalom! Absalom! as “an answer that doesn’t answer
—
an answer  
that puts the answerer in
 
question” (8)—and the presence  of unresolved  
psychological tensions originating in miscegenation, the denied
 actuality which unrelentingly subjects racial oppositions to the type of
 subversive interrogation Luce Irigaray directs against Freud’s gender
 oppositions in “The Blind Spot of an Old Dream of Symmetry.”
 Orienting his discussion specifically toward Faulkner’s rejection of the
 binary oppositions inherent in “Manichaeanism,” Sundquist writes:
 “The gothicism of Absalom! Absalom! is not by any means the
 sentimentality of a minstrel show—not the benign dream in which ’all
 coons look alike’—but the nightmare in which black and white begin
 all too hauntingly to look alike” (99). Harris and Chesnutt in fact
 prefigure this Faulknerian dilemma, a dilemma inherent in the minstrel
 show from the beginning. 
As
 Ostendorf writes, “Minstrelsy anticipated  
on stage what many Americans deeply feared: the blackening of
 America. Minstrelsy did in fact create a symbolic language and a
 comic iconography for ’intermingling’ culturally with the African
 Caliban while at the same time ’isolating’ him socially. In blackening
 his face the white minstrel acculturated voluntarily to his ’comic’
 vision of blackness, thus anticipating in jest what he feared in
 earnest....Minstrelsy 
is
 proof  that negrophilia and negrophobia are not  
at all contradictory. Minstrelsy is negrophobia staged as negrophilia,
 or vice versa, depending on the respective weight of the fear or
 attraction” (67, 81). To state this in specifically deconstructive terms,
 the minstrel show—whether manifested in the Uncle Remus tales,
 Faulkner’s novels, or, as Charles Sanders brilliantly suggests,
 T.S. Eliot’s “Waste Land”—subverts its own meaning by
 deconstructing the binary opposition on which its
 
hierarchical structures 
depend, creating a form
 
of expression  which demands confrontation with  
an infinitley extensive/regressive chain of
 
signifiers. Which is to say:  
white
 
minstrelsy deconstructs  itself.
Nowhere is this clearer than in Uncle Remus, His Songs and
 Sayings, the text through which Harris engendered a
 
long line of Euro ­
American negrophiles. 
As
 Harris seems to have sensed —he attributed  
the writing of the Brer Rabbit tales to an internal “other fellow” who
 “is simply a spectator of my folly until I seize a pen, and then he
 comes
 
forward and takes charge” (Martin, 92)— and as  Bernard Wolf first  
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articulated in his 1949 essay “Uncle Remus and the Malevolent
 
Rabbit,” the volume in fact presents a sequence of “answers that don’t
 answer, that put the answerer in question.” Just beneath the
 negrophiliac surface of the “charming” tales (most of
 
them faithfully  
reproduced from the
 
Afro-American oral tradition) Harris expropriates  
from/to the benevolently asexual Uncle Remus lies
 
a world  of violence,  
sexual energy, and barely subdued racial drama
 
in which the physically  
weak Brer Rabbit attains at least momentary mastery over the stronger
 but less aware Brers Bear, Wolf and Fox through his manipulation of
 the gap between verbal signifier and concrete action. Encoded within
 the ordered hierarchy of the Plantation Tradition, the trickster figure
 delights in the disruption of
 
hierarchies, textual or contextual, almost  
without reference to their apparent significance. At times, as in “The
 Wonderful Tar-Baby Story,” this radically subversive delight works to
 Brer Rabbit’s detriment. When Brer Rabbit takes on the role of the
 “master” demanding respect from the tar
 
baby—a  profoundly charged  
figure for the “black” pole of oppositional racist thought (stupid, lazy,
 very
 
black, a thing)—his  discourse  subverts  his own claims of privilege  
as surely as his ability to turn Brer Fox into a riding horse elsewhere
 decenters the Plantation Tradition hierarchy. This aspect of the Brer
 Rabbit tales is particularly important
 
in relation to the development  of  
Afro-American deconstruction because it protects against substituting
 one
 
set of privileged terms for another. Although Wolf 's reading of the  
animal fables as slightly veiled allegories of racial hatred and sexual
 competition seems accurate, the random
 
and frequently self-destructive  
manifestations of Brer Rabbit’s deconstructive energies makes it clear
 that the tales
 
privilege neither the black or white  position.
An understanding of Chesnutt, however, requires some attention to
 the unconsciously self-deconstructing aspects of Harris’ adaptation of
 this already deconstructive material in Uncle Remus, His Songs and
 Sayings,
 
which subverts its own  intended meanings by encoding several  
thoroughly contradictory versions of
 
its Afro-American subjects. The  
tension emerges clearly in a comparison of the three major sections of
 the book. The irascible minstrel show darky signified by the name
 “Uncle Remus” in “His Sayings” and the loyal slave presented in the
 Plantation Tradition short
 
story “A  Story of the War” evince nothing of  
the creative energy of the story teller of “Legends of the Old
 Plantation.” Within the “Legends,” on which Harris’s reputation
 depends almost entirely, a similar tension exists between the frame
 tales, written in standard English, and the animal tales, written in a
 linguistically
 
accurate  dialect  which Harris  contrasts in his introduction  
specifically with “the intolerable misrepresentations of the minstrel
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stage" (39). As Harris' comment concerning the "other fellow"
 
intimates. an anxious but not quite articulated awareness that the
 linguistic and thematic tensions of the book cast his own identity as a
 unified subject into doubt, permeates Uncle Remus. The opening
 "Legend," "Uncle Remus Initiates the Little Boy," establishes nott one
 but two narrative frames, suggesting the unbridgeable distance between
 Euro-American signification and Afro-American experience, The most
 obvious 
f
rame tale concerning Uncle Remus and the seven-year-old boy  
establishes a symbolic equality between the ostensibly child-like black
 man and the actual white child, Harris's pastoral version of an earlier
 self similar to that constructed by Mark Twain in Tom Sawyer, a
 construction which reveals a deep longing for the Old South (Martin
 92-96). Alongside this frame, however, smother frame, almost entirely
 unrecognized, presents a "mature" perspective which "explains" how the
 collaboration between the ttwo "child-like" figures happens to have been
 written down on paper. Presented only at the beginning of the first
 legend, this frame is in some ways as subversive of oppositional hier
­archies as the Brer Rabbitt tales themselves. The little boy is introduced
 as a figure of absence; his mother "Miss Sally," a curiously asexual
 figure who will be refigured in the "Miz Meadows" of tthe Brer Rabbit
 tales, "misses" her child. Arriving at Uncle Remus's cabin, she sees
 her "boys" together and steps back. Hams concludes tthe initial frame
 with the sentence: "This is what 'Miss Sally' heard," Although there
 is no evidence that he was doing so as part of a conscious rhetorical
 strategy, Harris has in effect decentered his presence into at least four
 components: Uncle Remus who as story-teller plays the role of "the
 other fellow" in charge of Harris' pen; the little boy who bears the
 most obvious biographical relationship to Harris; the passive
 "feminine" figure who resembles the Harris who collected the tales
 attributed to Uncle Remus from a number of Afro-American
 "informants;" and the silent scribe, Harris the Atlanta Constitution
 columnist who attributes his tales not directly to the black tellers but to
 a white female intermediary. In this complex configuration, neither
 whiteness nor masculinity possesses the significance—as signifiers
 invoking a range of transcendent creative attributes—attributed them by
 the explicitly patriarchal and paternalistic Plantation Tradition writers.
Given the multitude of "presences" mediating between "Harris" and
 
his "subjects," it should come as no surprise to discover traces of
 mutually deconstructing forms of awareness throughout the "Legends,"
 "The End of Mr, Bear," for example, betrays its own ruling system of
 logic in several ways. Most obviously, the text subverts the
 Plantation Tradition opposition between benevolent white master and
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happy black slave through the contrast between the superficially
 
stereotypical frame and the vicious 
tale.
 Culminating in the death of  
Brer Bear (on the level
 
of racial  allegory, the symbolic white man) who  
Brer Rabbit tricks into sticking his head
 
into a  tree where it is stung by  
a swarm of bees, the text closes with an expression of barely veiled joy
 (attributed to Uncle Remus but consistent with the folk materials)
 derived from contemplation of this inverted lynching: “dar ole Brer
 B’ar hung, en ef his head ain’t swunk, I speck he hangin’ dar yit”
 (136). It seems almost unbelievable that no critic prior to Wolfe
 seems to have understood this even in part as a warning against the
 racial pride—ironically projected as a savage black desire for a
 “shrunken head”—which enforced the social privilege encoded in the
 black-white
 
opposition.
Even without
 
reference to the animal tale, “The End of Mr. Bear”  
provides clear evidence of the self-deconstructing tendency of Harris’
 text to “embarrass its own ruling systems of logic.” When the little
 boy comes to the cabin, he
 
finds Uncle Remus “unusually cheerful and  
goodhumored” (133). Signifying this good humor in the way most
 dear to slaveholders and Plantation Tradition writers who cited the
 slaves’ oral performances as proof of their contentment, Uncle Remus
 sings a song, “a senseless affair so far as the words were concerned.”
 Immediately after quoting a verse of this “non-signifying” song,
 however, Harris contradicts himself in a peculiar manner.
 Unconsciously underlining Harris’s evershifting Brer Rabbit-like
 relation to his text, the following passages reads: “The quick ear of
 Uncle Remus, however, had
 
detected the presence of the little boy, and  
he allowed his song to run into a recitation of nonsense, of
 
which the  
following, if it be rapidly spoken, will give a faint idea: ’Ole M’er
 Jackson, fines’ confraction, fell down sta’rs fer to git satisfaction; big
 Bill Fray, he rule de day, eve’ything he call fer come one, two by
 three. Gwine Tong one day, met Johnny Huby, ax him grine nine
 yards er steel fer 
me,
 tole me w’ich he couldn’t; den I hist ’im over  
Hickerson Dickerson’s barn-doors; knock ’im ninety-nine miles under
 water, w’en he rise, he rise in
 
Pike straddle un a  hanspike, en I lef’ ’im  
dar smokin’ er de hornpipe, Juba reda seda 
breda.
 Aunt Kate at de gate;  
I want to eat, she fry de meat en gimme skin, w’ich I fling it back
 agin. Juba!” This curious passage begins with an intimation of a
 level
 
of awareness in Uncle Remus, associated with his leporine “quick  
ear,” which allows him to shift from the “senseless affair” into “a
 recitation of nonsense.” The reasons for the shift or the difference
 between the two levels of
 
non-signifying discourse are never stated.  
Emphasizing the insufficiency of his written text which can provide
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only a “faint idea” of 
the
 oral expression of “Uncle Remus,” who exists  
only within the written text, Harris plunges into what, if recognized,
 would certainly have seemed a nightmarish minstrel show skit on the
 relationship between signifier and signified. Trapped within the
 hierarchical system which denies transcendence to the Afro-American
 subject, Harris can only dismiss Uncle Remus’s words, albeit with a
 great uneasiness grounded on his sense that the black voice signifies
 something
 
unavailable to any white “presence” in the text.
Clearly a version of the signifying rhetoric described by Gates,
 Uncle Remus’s speech 
is
 best understood as a quintessentially Afro-  
American manipulation of the “play of signifiers,” which includes
 numerous politically resonant images of conflict and/or Africanisms
 which subvert Plantation Tradition images without concern for specific
 referential meaning. Accepting the divergence between signifier and
 signified, the black voice encoded in the text subverts the previous
 interpretation of the words as nonsense. Immediately after the
 performance, which creates “bewilderment” in the young boy and,
 presumably, in the white readership guided by Harris’ remarks, Uncle
 Remus proceeds “with the air of one who had just given 
an
 important  
piece of information” (134). The black voice, aware that the
 destruction of an oppositional hierarchy resting on a simplistic sense of
 linguistic significance does not entail the destruction of all meaning,
 very nearly effects a successful revolution when Uncle Remus says:
 “Hit’s all des dat away, honey....En w’en 
you
 bin cas’n shadders  long ez  
de ole nigger, den you’ll fine out who’s w’ich, en w’ich’s who.”
 Acutely uncomfortable with the confusion of identity established
 through the verbal play of the “black” voice in the 
“
white” text, Harris  
seems unable to distinguish between 
his
 own voice and the voice of an  
“other” subverting the hierarchical 
system
 which privileges the written  
expression as a mark of civilization and humanity. Returning to the
 standard English of the frame tale, Harris attempts to reassert the
 Plantation Tradition stereotype which ascribes superior “capacity” to
 whites and only childlike significance to black expression: “The little
 boy made no response. He 
was
 in thorough sympathy with all the  
whims and humors of the old man, and his capacity for enjoying 
them was
 
large enough to include even those he could not understand.” Even  
the reassertion reveals subversive traces, 
however;
 the boy is silenced,  
uncomprehending. Shortly, the angry black voice of the Brer Rabbit
 tales will assume the central position in the world of the 
text.
 The  
deconstructive black voice renders the white personae silent, thereby
 creating a space for articulation of the subversive animal tale ending
 with the lynching of Brer Bear, condemned by his inability to see
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through Brer Rabbit’s masks. As ironic prelude, however, and
 
apparently without any awareness on the part of
 
Harris, Uncle Remus  
effects a role reversal which places the white child in the symbolic
 position of the subordinate attending to the marginal details of the
 master’s work: “Uncle Remus 
was
 finishing an axe-handle, and upon  
these occasions it was his custom to allow the child to hold one end
 while he applied sand-paper to the
 
other” (emphasis added). The final  
sentence of the
 
frame-story echoes,  almost word  for word, the standard  
Plantation Tradition description of slavery as a system benefiting both
 black and white: “These relations were pretty 
soon
 established, to the  
satisfaction of the parties most interested...” Operating in the newly
 created textual space, the final clause of the final framing sentence
 specifically contrasts the nonsense of the previous sections with the
 significance of the animal tale to come: “the old man continued his
 remarks, but this time not at random.” Even the
 
frame  tale, the section  
of Uncle Remus in which Harris attempts to impose the oppositional
 order of the Plantation Tradition on the Afro-American folk materials is
 subject to the
 
deconstructive  energies of the black voice. As the frame  
story metamorphoses into Brer Rabbit tale, the white writer’s voice
 surrenders itself to the black speaker’s as written by the white writer.
 
In
 effect, the text acknowledges a significance in the nonsignifying  
nonsense. This infiltration of what
 
Gates would  call a signifying black  
voice into not only the tale but the frame itself recalls Ostendorf’s
 comments on the minstrel show and prefigures the racial and aesthetic
 tensions of Faulkner’s greatest work
Appropriating the voice of the Euro-American figure who
 
established the ground on which he worked, Chesnutt
 
recognized and  
consciously manipulated the self-deconstructive form of
 
Uncle Remus.  
Particularly in The Conjure Woman, Chesnutt employs a complex
 rhetorical strategy, based on a deep understanding of the
 deconstructionist principles of the contextual determination of meaning
 and the infinite extendibility of context, anticipated in the Southern
 literary tradition only (if indeed at all) by the best work of Poe and
 Twain. Superficially, Chesnutt’s conjure stories mimic Harris’
 structure; a white narrator, writing in standard English, reports the
 charming but absurd tales of an old black man, presented in black
 dialect. Like Uncle Remus, Chesnutt’s Uncle Julius seems motivated
 by childlike selfish concerns. Uncle Remus cajoles the little boy into
 bringing him sweets; Uncle
 
Julius manipulates his white listeners, the  
relocated
 
northern businessman John and his wife Annie, into a variety  
of personal indulgences. Most critics who have discussed the
 relationship between frame tale and conjure story in The Conjure
11
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Woman concentrate on the economic dimension of the relationship
 
between Julius and John, or on Julius’ attempt to educate Annie
 concerning the realities of slavery (Ferguson; Andrews). While these
 observations shed light on the mimetic dimension of the text, they
 typically exclude those aspects which relate primarily to the
 communications process itself, the aspects which intimate Chesnutt’s
 awareness of numerous
 
deconstructive concerns.
The model of the rhetorical relationship between John and
 
Julius in  
The Conjure Woman comments directly on Chesnutt’s own position as
 an Afro-American writer working in a context dominated by Euro
­American oppositional hierarchies, particularly the Plantation Tradition
 stereotypes shaped by Harris, Thomas Nelson Page, and countless
 others publishing in the same magazines where “The Goophered
 Grapevine” and “The Conjurer’s Revenge” first appeared. Recognition
 of this parallel hinges on an understanding of the significance of the
 “mask” in the signifying tradition. In Mules and Men. Hurston
 described masking as follows: “the Negro, in spite of his open-faced
 laughter, his seeming acquiescence, is particularly evasive. You see we
 are a polite people and we do not say to our questioner, ’Get out of
 here! ’ We smile and tell him or her something that satisfies the white
 person because, knowing so little about
 
us, he doesn’t know what he is 
missing....The theory behind our tactics: ’The white man is always
 trying to know somebody else’s business. All right, I’ll set something
 outside the door of my mind for 
him
 to play with and handle. He can  
read my writing but he sho’ can’t read my mind. I’ll put this play toy
 in 
his
 hand, and  he will seize it and go away. Then I’ll say my say and 
sing my song” (4-5). Most immediately, this rhetorical strategy
 creates a space, simultaneously physical, verbal and psychological
 within which
 
the Afro-American  individual  and community can survive  
within a hostile racist culture. At times, it can serve as a more active
 political tool allowing Afro-Americans access to information or
 situations from which
 
they would be excluded if their true motives were  
recognized. Set against this
 
background, the figure Chesnutt creates in  
The Conjure Woman comes into focus as an elaborate mask, or set of
 masks designed to infiltrate Euro-American discourse 
and,
 in the long  
run, subvert the binary oppositions on which racial privilege depends.
 It should be noted in approaching this strategy that, as soon as an
 audience recognizes the mask 
as
 a mask, the mask loses all possible  
effectiveness. The nature of the masking strategy, therefore, depends
 on the trickster’s ability to convince the audience that it sees his/her
 actual face. One of the conceptually simple but practically
 inexhaustible methods for attaining this goal is to construct “false”
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masks,
 
masks over masks, which  the audience is allowed  to ee through  
in order to convince it that it has seen the
 
trickster’s face when in fact it  
is encountering only another mask. 
In
 effect, Chesnutt uses such a  
strategy to construct a complex model of
 
practical deconstruction in  
which the masking Julius, prefiguring the doubly conscious Afro-
 American modernist writer, manipulates his audience through his
 awareness of the structure and limitations of Euro-American
 oppositional thought and his understanding of the potential uses of a
 marginal position.
Reflecting his situation as a light-skinned “black” writer born in
 
North Carolina but living in Ohio, Chesnutt creates two personae,
 textual masks: John,
 
with whom he shares geographical residence  and  a  
Euro-American literacy based on writing and knowledge of white
 institutional structures (Stepto 167); and Julius, with whom he shares
 racial and geographical origins and “tribal literacy,” based on oral
 expression and specifically black cultural patterns (Stepto, 167).
 Dividing “himself’ into two figures who, in the binary oppositions of
 the Plantation Tradition, are mutually exclusive and irresolvable,
 Chesnutt anticipates Saussure in deconstructing the linguistic
 convention, crucial to mimetic fiction, which asserts the identity of
 signifier and signified. Nonetheless, Chesnutt’s audience, excluding
 from its discourse any cultural traditions positing alternatives to
 oppositional thinking and assuming the identity of signifier and
 signified, was almost totally unprepared to understand his critique.
 Chesnutt’s “solution” to the problem brought the implicitly
 deconstructive elements of
 
the masking/signifying tradition of  Afro-  
Ameri can culture very near the  surface of The Conjure Woman.
What I am suggesting is that Julius in The Conjure Woman, like
 Chesnutt in the literary culture of 
his
 era, constructs a sequence of  
increasingly
 
opaque masks, predicated on  his knowledge of the  structure  
of his audience’s belief systems and implying a recognition of the
 underlying perceptions asserted in Culler’s identification of
 deconstruction with “the twin principles of 
the 
contextual  determination  
of
 
meaning and the infinite extendability of context.” On the surface  
the Julius of “The Goophered Grapevine” appears to be motivated
 
by  
economic self-interest, telling the story of the haunted vineyard in an
 attempt to scare John off and keep the grapes for himself. But this
 mask 
is
 absurdly transparent. Julius, of course, has no hope of fright ­
ening John, the “hard-headed” businessman, with romantic fancy. If
 John grants Julius any economic concessions it is because he is an
 essentially well meaning “master.” 
In
 fact, Julius seems aware of the  
actual economic dynamic when he stresses the past bounty of the
13
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vineyard and the crucial role played by blacks in maintaining its
 
productivity. In addition to suggesting a less direct economic motive,
 this double voicing intimates Julius's awareness that his white audience
 is in fact less unified than it appears. Employing many of the standard
 images associated with the 19th century sentimental fiction addressed
 primarily to a female audience—particularly those focusing on the
 division of families (Fiedler)—Julius addresses not only John but also
 Annie, whom he gradually educates concerning the inhumanity of the
 slave system of the old South, Given the composition of Chesnutt's
 magazine audience, it seems likely that he perceived the parallel
 between Julius's rhetorical strategy and his own. Allowing male
 readers seeking escapist fantasy to perceive him, like Julius, as a simple
 storyteller who "seemed to lose sight of his auditors, and to be living
 over again in monologue his life on the old plantation" (12-13),
 Chesnutt simultaneously educated his "female" audience, which itself
 occupied a marginal position in patriarchal/paternalistic culture,
 concerning the actual brutalities of racial relations.
Adopting an essentially deconstructive narrative technique, Julius
 
places his subversive criticism of the romantic image of the "Old
 South" in the margins of his tale. Frequently, his most pointed
 criticism occurs in the background descriptions of what life was like
 "befo' de wah," a common formula in the nostalgic stories of Page and
 others. In "The Goophered Grapevine," for example, Julius says: "I
 reckon it ain' so much so nowadays, but befo' de wah, in slab'ry times,
 a nigger did n9 mine goin fi' er ten mile in a night, w'en dey wuz
 sump'n good ter eat at de yuther een'" (14), Contrasted with the illicit
 treats the boy gives Uncle Remus or with the slave banquet in Paul
 Laurence Dunbar's poem "The Party," the political point of Julius'
 marginal "literary criticism" seems unmistakeable. Especially in the
 early tales, Julius makes political points obliquely since more direct
 approaches might alienate John and result in his exclusion from the
 situation in which he can address Annie, As Julius establishes himself
 within the structure of John and Annie's lives, however, he alters his
 strategy. By "Mars Jeems's Nightmare," the third story in the
 collection, he focuses on a harsh master whose attitudes change
 substantially after he is transformed into a slave for a period of time;
 clearly, Julius feels free to include much more explicit social
 commentary than he had previously. Although John retains his
 condescending belief in the childlike simplicity of blacks in his ironic
 comment—"I am glad, too, that you told us the moral of the story; it
 might have escaped us otherwise"—, there is no danger that he will use
 his social privilege to exclude Julius from the discourse into which they
14
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have entered. The strategy of “Mars Jeems’ Nightmare” depends,
 
therefore, on that of “The Goophered Grapevine” which disarmed John
 by playing on his belief that he “understands” Julius when he has
 actually only seen through a transparent economic mask. The long-term
 success of the strategy, however, requires periodic reenforcement of
 John’s assumption, evidence Julius provides in “The Conjurer’s
 Revenge” when he tricks John into buying a blind horse. The real
 significance of Julius’s interaction with John, then, lies not in the
 success or failure of a particular trick but in the control he attains over
 the context in which he can direct his “marginal” address to Annie to
 communal rather than
 
individual benefits.
When he allows this mask to become transparent in the didactic
 “Mars Jeems’ Nightmare,”
 
Julius extends the basic principle to another  
level of contextual complexity. 
By
 convincing relatively liberal whites  
such as Annie, who are willing to face the somewhat distanced reality
 of the brutality of the Old South (itself part of a binary opposition of
 north-civilized/ south-primitive) that they have seen the true face of the
 black “petitioner”, Chesnutt creates a context in which his more
 radically subversive deconstructive message can infiltrate the literary
 forum. Having entered this discourse, Chesnutt may in fact discredit
 both conservative Old South and liberal New South through the
 structural analogy between the whites in the fables Julius tells and
 those in the frame story Chesnutt writes. From this perspective, John
 and Annie can be seen as new incarnations of the
 
old masters subjecting  
Afro-Americans to a 
system
 of discourse and institutional organization  
that denies their humanity. Allowing his readers to penetrate a
 sequence of transparent masks, Chesnutt articulated an extremely
 intricate parody which expands to deconstruct the ostensible opposition
 of “liberal North” and “reactionary South,” both of which manifest a
 similar set of racist attitudes. Condescension, active oppression and
 pity are equally compatable with the binary oppositions of the
 Plantation Tradition. Perhaps Chesnutt’s final target, in his immediate
 context, 
is
 the predominantly Northern readership who, like John and  
Annie, are willing to indulge the transparent “entertainments” of a
 charming black storyteller, perhaps even accepting a limited political
 critique, as 
long
 as it leaves the social framework undisturbed.
Each level of this process moves toward the actual context
 
in which 
Chesnutt wrote, raising questions regarding the interaction of
 
text and  
world and implicitly repudiating the traditional view of fiction as a
 privileged form of discourse. Extending this approach temporally, it
 would be possible to see Chesnutt as attempting to educate a future
 audience, or perhaps future Afro-American writers, in the methods of
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deconstructionist/masking reading and writing. Of course such reading
 
writers, whites or “literate” blacks, themselves would be subject to
 interpretation as new incarnations of John and Annie determined to
 master Afro-American
 
experience through ever more  subtle techniques.  
At some point in this infinitely extendible context, Chesnutt’
s deconstructions flip over into a kind of structuralist (thought not
 ahistorical) awareness of the persistence of the deeply ingrained
 oppositional structures characterizing Euro-American discourse and
 supporting oppressive institutions. In speculating on the long-term
 implications of the rhetorical structure
 
of The Conjure Woman,  I realize  
I have ventured forth onto shifting ground. The final stages of the
 process outlined above
 
are unsupported and, by  nature, unsupportable.  
The last mask must always remain opaque, at least to its immediate
 audience. Any evidence of its construction renders it partially
 transparent and subjects it to possible
 
exclusion from the public forum,  
destroying any hope of political effectiveness. The play of signifiers
 must resist closure in order to resist the power of the dominant
 discourse. Nevertheless, Chesnutt provides enough textual
 
evidence to  
suggest this approach is not simply a postmodernist imposition, an
 academic re-voicing of
 
the plantation tradition distortion of  the Afro-  
American voice. Both the contrast between John’s and Julius’s
 linguistic practices and the specific choices of material for the tales
 Julius tells intimate Chesnutt’s conscious awareness of basic decon-
 structive approaches to 
discourse. Possessing only a minimal sense of irony, John assumes the
 identity of signifier and
 signified.
 Because  his  attitude toward southern  
life has been shaped
 
by literature,  John perceives Julius in terms of the  
signifiers of the plantation tradition. Rather than leading to a
 relaxation of his belief in the adequacy of the signifiers, perceived
 discrepencies between signifier and signified 
are
 resolved by adjusting  
his
 
conception of th  signified. John's  belief in the plantation tradition  
stereotype attributing mental capacity solely to the white term of the
 white/black binary opposition leads him to create a mixed ancestry for
 Julius: “There was a shrewdness in his eyes, too, which was not
 altogether African, and which, as we afterwards learned from
 
experience,  
was indicative of a corresponding
 
shrewdness in his character” (9-10).  
Similarly, the frame story of “Mars Jeems’s Nightmare” emphasizes
 
the  
underlying structure of the binary opposition which defines blacks as
 subhuman. Extending the black-physical/white-mental dichotomy,
 John describes Julius’s relationship with the “natural” world: “Toward
 my tract of land and
 the 
things  that were  on it—the creeks, the swamps,  
the hills, the meadows, the stones, the trees—he maintained a
 
peculiar  
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personal attitude, that might
 
be called  predial rather than proprietary.  
He had been accustomed, until long after middle life, to look upon
 himself as the property of
 
another. When this relation was no longer  
possible, owing to the war, and
 
to his master’s death and the  dispersion  
of the family,
 
he had been unable to break off entirely  the mental habits 
of a
 
lifetime, but had attached himself to the old plantation,  of which he  
seemed to consider himself
 
an appurtenance” (64-65). In addition to  
supporting politically destructive institutions, such reduction of the
 black subject reveals John’s simplistic linguistic and philosophical
 premises. Foregrounding the deconstructionist tendencies implicit in
 Uncle Remus, The Conjure Woman suggests ways of subverting the
 power of the discourse resulting
 
from such simplistic premises.
Recognizing John’s tendency to confuse white metaphorical signif
­ication
 
with the  actuality  of the “black  thing” signified,  Julius bases his  
strategy on the manipulation of the unrecognized distance between
 signifier and signified. Where John assumes presence, Julius implies
 absence. Frequently, Julius’ speech implies the inadequacy of the
 signifier=signified paradigm, drawing attention
 
to the ways in  which the  
linguistic position serves institutional structures whose actual
 operations the language veils. For example, Julius describes Mars
 Jeems’s relations with 
his
 slaves as follows: “ His niggers wuz  bleedzd  
ter slabe fum daylight ter
 
da’k, w’iles yuther folks’s did n’ hafter wuk  
’cep’n’ fum sun ter sun” (71). Rhetorically accepting the distinction
 between “daylight ter da’k”
 
and “sun ter sun,” this  sentence parodies the  
way in which white folks, especially when they want to evade their
 own position in an unjust system, employ different signifiers to
 obscure what from the Afro-American perspective appear to be identical
 signifieds. Although the sun rises after light and sets before dark, the
 distinction, which might be emphasized by a good master as
 
evidence  of  
his kindness, does nothing to alter the fact that in either case, the
 enforced labor is of murderous duration. Frequently Julius bases his
 rhetoric on the apparent acceptance of a white signifier, as in “The
 Goophered Grapevine” which identifies the slave Henry with the
 vineyard
 
in much the same way John identifies Julius with the “things”  
of the plantation. By adapting John’s preconceptions, Julius finds it
 much easier to construct an effective mask. As Gates notes in his
 discussion of the “Signifying Monkey,” who along with Brer Rabbit
 provides the closest analog for Uncle Julius in the folk tradition, “the
 Signifying Monkey [Julius, Chesnutt] is able to signify upon the Lion
 [John, the white
 
readership) only because the Lion does not  understand  
the nature of the Monkey’s discourse....The Monkey speaks
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figuratively, in a symbolic code, whereas the Lion interprets or ’reads’
 
literally” (133-134).
A similar dynamic 
is
 at work in relation to the “folk” tales which  
charmed and fascinated
 
both  Julius’ auditors in the text  and Chesnutt’s  
readership. Because the tales are presented in dialect within a frame
 readily familiar to readers of Harris, most contemporary reviewers
 assumed that Chesnutt was presenting “authentic” Afro-American folk
 tales; several hostile reviews criticized The Conjure Woman for simply
 repeating folk materials without adequate imaginative transformation.
 As Melvin Dixon demonstrates, however, only one of
 
the tales (“The  
Goophered Grapevine”) 
is
 an authentic folk tale. While the remainder  
incorporate folk elements, Chesnutt transforms them in a way which
 deconstructs the hierarchy on which the negative judgments rest. The
 recurring images of transformation in
 
the tales—Sandy turns into  a tree,  
Mars Jeems into a slave, Henry into a kind of human grapevine, etc.—
 implicitly repudiate the identification of signifier with transcendent
 signified. Identity 
is
 multiple, shifting, a play of forces rather than a  
transcendent
 
essence. Chesnutt charmingly plunges his readers into the  
Faulknerian minstrel show/nightmare in which the answers place the
 answerers in question, names surrender their significance, becoming a
 source of ironic play in which the devil turns from black to white:
 “Mars Jeems’s oberseah wuz a po’ w’ite man name’ Nick Johnson,—de
 niggers called ’im Mars Johnson ter his face, but behin’ his back dey
 useter call ’im Ole Nick, en de name suited ’im ter a T” (75). Deprived
 of their linguistic base, dichotomies collapse, including that of white-
 classical-written-civilized/black-vemacular-oral-savage. For, although
 Chesnutt used Afro-American folk materials, the clearest source of the
 charming stories in The Conjure Woman is Ovid’
s
 Metamorphosis.  
The
 
illiterate former slave and the classical poet play  one another’s  roles  
in the minstrel show in which
 
black  and white begin to look very much  
alike. 
In
 a rhetorical gambit worthy of “The Purloined Letter” or the  
Signifying Monkey, Chesnutt draws attention to the similarity between
 Julius’ concerns and those of the Euro-American philosophical
 
tradition  
at the beginning
 
of “The Gray Wolfs Ha’nt” when John sits down with  
Annie and reads; “The difficulty of dealing with transformations so
 many-sided as those which all existences have undergone, or are
 undergoing, is 
such
 as to make a complete  and deductive interpretation  
almost hopeless. So to grasp the total process of redistribution of
 matter and motion as to see simultaneously its several necessary results
 in their actual interdependence
 
is scarcely possible. There is, however,  
a mode of rendering the process as a whole tolerably comprehensible.
 Though the genesis of the rearrangement of every evolving aggregate is
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in itself one, it presents to our intelligence” (163-164). When Annie
 
repudiates the passage as “nonsense,” John claims that this is
 philosophy “in the simplest and most lucid form.” His failure to
 understand either the deconstructive implications of the emphasis on
 transformation and interdependence or the similarity between the
 philosophical passage and Julius’ tales would seem clumsily ironic
 were it not for the fact that Chesnutt’s ostensibly “literate” Euro
­American readership shared the blindness. In addition, Annie’s
 impatience with the
 
philosophical discourse, contrasted with her eager  
but simplistic acceptance of Julius’s oral versions, suggests intriguing
 approaches to the problem of audience which effects both Afro-
 American writers and Euro-American theorists.
“Baxter’s Procrustes,” the
 
last  story  Chesnutt published prior to the  
literary silence of his last twenty seven years, reflects his growing
 despair over
 
the absence  of an audience sensitive to his concerns. Not  
coincidentally,
 
the story provides clear evidence that, even as he wrote  
the “conventional” novels (The House Behind the Cedars, The Marrow
 of Tradition, The Colonel’s Drea
m
) which have veiled  the complexity  
of the works which frame them, Chesnutt continued to develop his
 awareness of concerns which have entered the mainstream of Euro
­American literary discourse only with the emergence of the
 deconstructionist movement. To a large extent, the issues raised in
 “Baxter’s Procrustes” are those described in Culler’s chapter on the
 “Critical Consequences
”
 of deconstruction. Culler catalogs four levels  
on which deconstruction has effected literary criticism, the “first and
 most important [of which] is deconstruction’s impact upon a series of
 critical concepts, including the concept of literature itself’ (180).
 Among the specific results of deconstruction he lists the following
 propositions. Deconstruction focuses attention on 1) the importance
 and problematic nature of figures, encouraging readings of “literary
 works as implicit rhetorical treatises, which conduct
 
in figurative  terms  
an argument about the literal and the figural” (185);
 
2)
“intertextuality,”
 
the  “relations  between one representation and another  
rather than between a textual imitation and a nontextual
 
original” (187);  
3)
 
the gap between signifier and signified,  leading  to the conclusion  that  
there “are
 
no final meanings that  arrest the movement  of signification”  
(188); 4) the parergon, the “problem of the frame—of
 the
 distinction  
between inside and outside and of the structure of the border” (193); and
 5) the problematic nature of self-reflexivity, which implies “the
 inability of any discourse to account for itself and the failure of
 performative and constative or doing and being to coincide” (201).
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“Baxter’s Procrustes,” a parody of a literary club tricked into
 
publishing and giving glowing reviews to a book which contains no
 words whatsoever, reads from a contemporary perspective as a treatise
 on the deconstructive issues Culler identifies. The “figural”
 descriptions of the reviewers, including the narrator, entirely supercede
 the book’s “literal” contents, underlining the problematic relationship
 between signifiers and signified. The text’s emphasis on the value of
 “uncut copies” of the book, ostensibly a printing of a poem parts of
 which Baxter has presented orally, draws attention to the problem of
 intertextuality. In Chesnutt’s configuration, written copy and verbal
 “original” assume significance 
only
 intertextually, as they relate to one  
another; the probability that no “original” of Baxter’s Procrustes exists
 renders the concept of “final meanings that arrest the movement of
 signification” absurd. Even the critical attempts to construct a final
 meaning are presented in terms of intertextuality. Responding to the
 comments of a fellow critic, the narrator observes: “I had a vague
 recollection of having read something like this somewhere, but so
 much has been written that one can scarcely discuss any subject of
 importance without unconsciously borrowing, now and then, the
 thoughts or the language of others” (419). Especially in regard to a
 “text” consisting entirely of absence, the most promising field of play
 for original critical 
thought,
 no definitive interpretation is  possible. At  
his most insightful, the narrator half-recognizes the distance between
 his figuration and the actual text, writing that he “could see the cover
 through the wrapper of my sealed copy” (420). Chesnutt seems
 explicitly aware that this deconstruction of critical/philosophical
 certainties implies a parallel deconstruction of the idea of the unified
 transcendent subject. The interrelationship between psychological and
 linguistic realities assumes a foreground position when the narrator
 claims that Baxter “has written himself into the poem. By knowing
 Baxter we are 
able
 to  appreciate the book,  and after having read the book  
we feel that we are so much the more intimately acquainted with
 Baxter—the real Baxter” (418). Like all “subjects” of deconstructive
 thought, Baxter’s significance can be perceived only through
 recognition of his absence.
The most interesting aspects of “Baxter’s Procrustes” however,
 
involve framing and self-reflexivity. Tracing the concept of the
 parergon—the “supplement” or “frame” of
 
the aesthetic work—to its  
ill/logical extreme, Chesnutt again anticipates the deconstructive
 perception summarized by Culler as follows: “The supplement is ess
­ential. Anything that 
is
 properly framed...becomes an art object; but  
if framing is what creates the aesthetic object, this does not make the
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frame a determinable entity whose qualities could be isolated” (197).
 
“Baxter’s Procrustes” foregrounds this issue; frame and object
 simultaneously give one another significance—a significance derived
 purely from the traces each leaves in the other’s field of absence—and
 deconstruct the hierarchical relationship between “ground” and “figure.”
 The binding, which is the sole concern of the narrator’s “review” 
is decorated with the fool’s cap and bells, in effect becoming the “work”
 which derives its meaning from the parergonal absence of the empty
 pages. The narrator’
s
 description of the form of the words on the page  
in Baxter’s Procrustes, based entirely
 
on intertextual hearsay, articulates  
both his blindness and his insight: “The text is a beautiful, slender
 stream, meandering gracefully through a wide meadow of margin”
 (419). This recognition in turn suggests an awareness of context as
 frame. Extending the concern with the audience introduced in The
 Conjure Woman, “Baxter’s Procrustes” presents a model of a literary
 discourse in which cultural frame and literary text cannot be clearly
 distinguished.
Published in the Atlantic Monthly, this openly self-reflexive text
 
comments on itself and its audience, anticipating the deconstructive
 concern with the way “Texts thematize, with varying degrees of
 explicitness, interpretive operations and their consequences and thus
 represent in advance the dramas that will give life to the tradition of
 their interpretation” (Culler 214-215). Sharing a title with 
an
 empty  
book reviewed by fools who drive the author out of their community
 while they continue to profit from his production—“sealed copy” of
 Baxter’s Procrustes is sold for a record price at a club auction after
 Baxter’s expulsion—Chesnutt’s “Baxter’s Procrustes” anticipates its
 own “misreadings.” Interestingly, it also anticipates future “positive”
 readings in the club president’s suggestion that Baxter “was wiser than
 we knew, or than he perhaps appreciated” 
(421).
 The retrospective  
appreciation of Baxter’s “masterpiece” (420), however,
 
relates solely to  
its economic value. Suspended in a context in which Uncle Julius’
 original auditors, Chesnutt’s contemporary readers, and, perhaps, even his future (deconstructionist) critics share an inability to perceive the
 true values of an Afro-American text, (“)Baxter’s Procrustes(”) seems
 acutely aware that its self-reflexivity
 
does not transcend the gap between  
signifier and signified, attain closure or imply self-possession. In this
 recognition, as in so much else, Chesnutt seems much more proto
­deconstructionist than the marginal Plantation Tradition figure he has
 traditionally
 
been seen  to be.
To remark Chesnutt’s engagement with deconstructive concerns
 does not imply his ability to resolve their more disturbing
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implications. Confronting his marginalization and the failure of his
 
audience to respond to anything other than the surface of his texts,
 Chesnutt fell into a literary silence like that of another pre-modemist
 American deconstructionist Herman Melville, or those of the women
 writers Tillie Olsen discusses in her profoundly moving essay on
 “Silences.” Olsen catalogs a number of professional circumstances
 which drive marginal writers into giving up their public voices.
 Among the most powerful forces are “devaluation” (“books of great
 worth suffer the death of being unknown, or at best a peculiar
 eclipsing,” 40); “critical attitudes” (“the injurious reacting to a book,
 not for its quality or content, but on the basis of its having been
 written
 
by a woman [or black],” 40); and, perhaps most important, the  
“climate in  literary circles for those who move  in  them” (“Writers know  
the importance of
 
being taken seriously, with respect for one’s vision  
and integrity; of comradeship with other writers; of being dealt with as
 a writer on the basis of one’s work and not for other reasons,” 41).
 Chesnutt clearly confronted each of these problems without finding an
 adequate solution.
This breakdown (or
 
absence) of contact between artist and audience  
parallels a similar situation, also leading to withdrawal from
 engagement with the context, 
which
 some  observer/participants, myself  
among them, see 
as
 a major problem of contemporary theoretical  
discourse. Critics whose insights would seem to possess profound
 social significance find themselves in the situation of John reading to
 Annie; the form of their discourse and lack of contextual awareness
 alienate their audience and, all too frequently, the critics respond by
 retreating into a contemptuous solipsism which guarantees that the
 subversive implications of their work will not have substantial effect
 on the context. One particularly unfortunate manifestation of this
 pattern has been the almost unchallenged alienation of Euro- and Afro-
 American discourse, an alienation addressed but not yet contextualized,
 by a small group of Afro-American (Stepto, Gates) and feminist
 theorists (Johnson, Rich). Still, further work towards a context which
 allows, to use Culler’s phrase, “these discourses to communicate with
 one another,” offers intriguing possibilities for avoiding the nihilistic
 impasse and tapping the political potential of
 
deconstructive thought.  
To begin, deconstruction
 
possesses the potential for substantially allev ­
iating the conditions which forced Chesnutt—and a long line of succ
­essors including Hurston, Wright, Baldwin, and William Melvin
 Kelley—into exile. By focusing attention on the margin and
 articulating the recurring concerns of the folk-based Afro-American
 tradition in a vocabulary 
which
 can be recognized by  the  educated Euro-
22
Studies in English, New Series, Vol. 9 [1991], Art. 3
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/studies_eng_new/vol9/iss1/3
Craig Werner 23
American readership which continues to comprise the majority of the
 
literary audience, deconstruction at least
 
theoretically  could help  create  
an audience sensitive to the actual complexities of Afro-American
 expression. At present, this potential remains unrealized, in large
 
part  
because the literary
 
community in  which deconstruction  has developed  
continues to exercise its social privilege in a
 
manner which suggests a  
continued belief, clearly inconsistent with its articulated perceptions,
 that its own cultural tradition serves as the center of serious literary
 discourse.
Precisely because Afro-American culture continues to be excluded
 
from, or marginalized in, Euro-American discourse, writers
 
working in  
the wake of Chesnutt offer a great deal of potential insight into the
 blindness of the Euro-American theoretical discourse (which most
 certainly offers an analogous set
 
of insights in return). A passage from  
Derrida’s De la grammatologie quoted in Culler’s chapter on
 
“Writing  
and Logocentrism” provides suggestive evidence of both the actuality
 and the implications
 
of the Euro-American  exclusion of Afro-American  
expression. Referring to the privileging of speech found in numerous
 European discussions of the nature of writing, Derrida writes: “The
 system of ’hearing/understanding-oneself-speak’ through the phonic
 substance—which presents itself as a non-exterior, non-worldly and
 therefore non-empirical or non-contingent signifier—has necessarily
 dominated the history
 
of the world during an entire epoch, and has even  
produced 
the
 idea of the world, the idea of world-origin, arising from the  
difference between
 
the worldly  and the non-worldly, the outside  and the  
inside, ideality and non-ideality, universal and non-universal,
 transcendental and empirical” (107). Asserting that a particular
 European philosophical discourse “necessarily” dominates the “history
 of the world,
”
 Derrida excludes  a wide range of cultural traditions based  
on relational conceptions of identity which treat
 
significance as  derived  
from process. Contrasting with the beliefs in individual subjectivity
 and transcendental signification characteristic of the system Derrida
 deconstructs, many African-based
 
discourses (while no doubt  subject t  
analogous deconstructions) suggest approaches to impasses in thought
 and action which, at the very least, should be of interest to those
 members of the deconstructionist movement concerned with the
 practical impact of their perceptions. Specifically, the conception of
 performance embedded in Afro-American aesthetics (Jones, Sidran,
 Scheub), particularly as articulated in music and verbal signifying,
 suggests that the feeling of alienation characteristic of many decon
­structionist texts is not a necessary product of the recognition that
 speech does not create
 
a “non-exterior, non-worldly and therefore non-  
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empirical or non-contingent signifier.” From the perspective of the
 
excluded tradition which uses “call-and-response,” the performative
 dynamic in which the meaning of any signification derives from the
 interaction of individual and community in relation to a specific set of
 social circumstances, the inadequacy of the Euro-American system
 which Derrida deconstructs seems obvious. More important than the
 parallel perception as such is the fact that Afro-American writers,
 experiencing the “double consciousness” which makes it impossible for
 them
 
to exclude the Euro-American tradition  from their expression even  
if they so desire, have been exploring the practical implications of the
 intersection of modes of thought for nearly a century. Opening
 theoretical discourse to consideration of complex Afro-modernist texts
 such 
as
 Melvin Tolson’s Harlem Gallery. Langston Hughes’ “Montage  
of a Dream Deferred,” and Hurston’s Moses Man of the Mountain
 might substantially alter the “feel” if not the conceptual underpinnings
 of contemporary theoretical discourse.
Perhaps the most important result of such consideration, derived
 
from the origins of the Afro-American concern with deconstruction in
 both the relational conception of signification characteristic of the
 African continuum and the political circumstances of slavery and
 continuing oppression (based on the continuing dominance of the
 binary oppositions of American racial thought), would be to caution
 against l)a relapse into the solipsistic withdrawal available primarily to
 those capable of exercising social privilege and 2) the separation of
 deconstructionist discourse from engagement with the institutional
 contexts in which it exists. Despite the prevalence of 
such
 separation  
in American academic discourse, it is not in fact inherent in
 deconstruction, a point made by both Eagleton and Culler. Attributing
 such separation to Anglo-American academicians (a.k.a. the demons of
 Yale), Eagleton stresses that “Derrida is clearly out to do more than
 develop new techniques of 
reading:
 deconstruction is for  him an ultim ­
ately
 
political practice, an attempt to dismantle the logic by which a  
particular system of thought, and behind that a whole system of
 political structures and social institutions, maintains its force” (148).
 Similarly, Culler emphasizes that “inversions of hierarchical
 oppositions expose to debate the
 
institutional arrangements that rely on  
the hierarchies and thus open possibilities of change” (179). Acutely
 aware of the ways in which even his sympathetic readers, and
 
I suspect  
that would include many of the critics 
(I
 would not except myself)  
working toward an opening of discourses, continued to reenact the hier
­archical minstrel show of the plantation tradition, Charles Chesnutt
 sensed this significance nearly a century ago. Like the guys at the
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garage—and, I suspect, the “girls” at the grocery—, he knew that the
 
man’s mouth is cut cross ways and that the cross cuts a figure flattering
 to the man. Now we can begin to figure out
 
where the meanings lie.
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